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The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective. By Carl Joachim Friedrich.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. x, 253. $4.75.
Professor Friedrich's new work is an ambitious attempt to survey the evolution of Western philosophy of law from ancient Judaism through the midtwentieth century and to formulate, against this historical background, his
own comprehensive philosophy of law. In achieving the first of these goals, the
book proves to be singularly successful despite the monumentality of the task
and the comparative brevity of its treatment. No significant purpose would be
served by a detailed review of this synoptic historical presentation which occupies approximately four-fifths of the book. Suffice it to say that with a few
reservations concerning the treatment of recent developments, this reviewer
found the author's presentation to be accurate and complete in its descriptive
aspect and lucid in its critical aspect. Such praise must be qualified, however,
with respect to the concluding two chapters of the historical presentation which
discuss, respectively, the positions of the modern skeptics (relativists, formalists,
realists) and what Friedrich describes as the current revival of natural law
notions. The exposition of modern skepticism is devoted largely to a refutation
based upon the author's philosophical position (thinly disguised, in some cases,
by utilizing the adverse commentary of others), whereas the discussion of modem natural law notions is thoroughly interlarded with and to some extent distorted by the author's ideas, which he ascribes to the natural law tradition.
Despite these deficiencies, the historical section could prove extremely useful as
a correlating or "background" text for a fundamental course in legal philosophy.
The controversial, if not unique, contribution of the book is to be found in its
concluding chapters where the author's views are expressly propounded. Starting from the premise that every ".... philosophy of law is part of a particular
general philosophy. . ." (p. 3), Professor Friedrich opens his book with a very
terse sketch of the general philosophical framework within which he intends not
only to construct his own philosophy of law but also to determine the validity
of other philosophies. This general philosophical position is derived from an essentially Kantian epistemology. Scientific knowledge may be derived only from
human experience. Such experience is not, however, confined to sense perceptions, as'the empiricists erroneously contended; it also embraces thinking,
willing, feeling and creating, all of which play significant roles in the formulation
of laws. It is impossible to organize all experience into a philosophically or
logically coherent unity; all attempts to do so have ultimately resulted in the
rejection of basic postulates derived from one or more realms of experience.
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For example, the human mind cannot consider the data of sense impressions
except within the framework of the law of causation which, however hypothetical such law may be when measured against a standard of reality, is part
of the very mechanism by which we experience sense data. On the other hand,
the experience of willing presupposes freedom of choice, which, however hypothetical it too may be, is an integral part of experiencing the act of willing.
Causation and freedom, fundamental principles derived from two realms of
experience, are logically contradictory. Any attempt to subsume them within a
unitary philosophical framework ultimately results in a denial of one or the
other-determinism results from rejecting freedom and voluntarism, from rejecting causation. Professor Friedrich categorizes all existing monistic philosophical systems as either deterministic or voluntaristic. An alternative is a
dualistic system, such as that of Kant, hypostatizing separate cognitive worlds
in which the contradictions do not occur. Other difficulties arise if one attempts
to correlate or equate the other human experiences-an observation which leads
the author to espouse an essentially pluralistic philosophical system which he
describes as a "radical philosophy of experience." Such a philosophy "stresses
problems" (i.e., obstacles) which inhere in the diverse kinds of experience. No
comprehensive philosophy with respect to a particular object of knowledge,
such as law, is possible without a complete grasp of the problems of all human
experience. Only by taking all experiences into account can we arrive at an
idea of law which is general in form and nevertheless corresponds to reality.
Turning from this general philosophical position to the author's particular
philosophy of law, one is told that the central problem of law is its relation to
justice. Justice is a"state to which the law is oriented as an approximation" (p.
191) or, to paraphrase the poet, law never is, but always seeks to be just. Thus,
justice is an objective reality independent of those who conceive it and of the
positive laws which should be intended to achieve it.
The function of justice as a standard for evaluating positive law is also a central theme in the descriptive or historical portion of the book. Indeed, Friedrich
rather neatly classifies most antecedent legal philosophy as either positivistic
(a view which he believes leads ineluctably to rejection of norms and the totalitarian conclusion that might is right) or based upon natural law notions (into
which category he groups all conceptions of law as having a normative content
not derived from observable phenomena). Friedrich's view of positivism, of
course, can be identified with the philosophical determinism of his earlier
dichotomy among monistic philosophical systems. To Friedrich the salient error
of positivism, as well as of determinism, is the equation of moral experience with
sense experience and the consequent attempt to formulate a science of morality
along the pattern of natural science free of value judgments or, as Friedrich
might put it, divorced from "historical, sociological, and political realities . .

(pp. 174-75).
What then is this objectively real justice toward which law should be
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oriented? This is an essentially political problem, says Friedrich, focused primarily upon the relationship between justice and equality and resolving itself
down into the fundamental issue of Aristotle's distributive justice: Who is equal
to whom? Rejecting again the positivist position that the question of equality is
inscrutable from a philosophical standpoint, Friedrich insists that much can be
said with a high degree of probability regarding equality, e.g., that inequahcdes
based upon birth or wealth are unjust because based upon biological or economic misconceptions. Seizing upon the premise that men ought to be equal
before the law, he deduces that the critical problem in this matter of equality
is who makes the laws. His answer seems to be that fundamental law-making
should be done by all members of the legal community because this is an essential attribute of their basic equality. Such highly circular demonstration is
fortified by the author's example of Western political development, as having
evolved an almost universally accepted solution to this problem in the form of
the political organization described as constitutional democracy.
But resolution of the central problem of distributive justice is not answered
simply by providing the policy-making machinery. Those who make the
decisions must themselves have certain characteristics in common, lest the
process of distributive justice become nothing more than, to use Friedrich's
metaphor, "finding the diagonal in a parallelogram of forces in the political
arena which would decide what is equal and what unequal," which would
amount to no more than a "naked positivism" (p. 194). It is common men"community-conscious citizens"--who cause a democratic community to prescribe laws which are more than a mere amalgam of interests. The common man,
as Friedrich sees him, is neither "the average man" nor "the mass man" (the
latter is characterized as being devoid of communal values); nor is he a member
of an elite. Instead, each of us is a common man insofar as we participate in
decisions about matters of common concern. Friedrich's doctrine of the common man must not, however, be confused with the purely rational conception
of justice inherent in the views of the English utilitarians and in Kant's idea
of a community based upon the categorical imperative. Modern social science
has established incontrovertibly that man's social relations are largely determined by his interests and passions. Friedrich accepts this and formulates his
idea of justice in terms of the achievement of common values.
Many human values are, of course, not a proper subject of legislation. Government must be confined to "questions of external order which are common to
all citizens" (pp. 195-96), as distinguished from the private sphere which encompasses religion, art, etc. In addition to providing a democratic policy-making framework based on separation of powers, the democratic constitution prescribes "basic rights" which delimit a private sphere into which governmental
authorities may not ordinarily intrude.
In the communal sphere decisions of common men are more likely to be right
than those of an elite which is not responsible to the community. Indeed, if
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human nature did not exhibit "certain traits essential for communal life" (p.
197), constitutional democracy would not be workable. Without further
elaboration, Friedrich asserts that history, sociology and psychology reveal
considerable regularity in human behavior in the very sphere of external legislation where government may properly act. It is this notion of the common in
man which causes Friedrich to label the doctrine of the common man as a
natural law notion. The common man can be effectively activated and the common in man thereby realized only if common men are given an opportunity to
participate in the creation of law. Such is Friedrich's second circular demonstration that the democratic form is the only method for arriving at just laws.
Friedrich's conception of justice, then, has a changing substantive content.
Although it is an external standard, existing apart from the wills of particular
individuals or even the arbitrary preferences of the community, it continually
evolves out of changes in the common values of the body politic. If this view
is to be more than a modified positivism, however, it obviously must require
something more for a law to be just than that it relate to the proper sphere of
government and receive the approval of common men acting within the framework of a constitutional democracy. Having expressly rejected possible solutions to this problem suggested by Rousseau's "general will" and Kant's "categorical imperative," Friedrich espouses, instead, a requirement of authority.
To be just, a law must have (or communicate) authority, which, too simply
stated, means that it must be reasonable. By this Friedrich does not mean that
a law must have or partake of absolute validity, i.e., a relationship to reality,
which, of course, Friedrich does not believe to be cognizable. Rather, the reasonableness of a law is determined by its susceptibility to reasoned elaboration
within the metarational framework of the system of ideas, values and beliefs
(the "transpersonal norms") accepted by the community. The naked exercise
of law-making power, therefore, must be reinforceable by reason," as such
reason expresses itself in the judgment of the old, the learned, and the wise"
(p. 204).
This reader has been unable to discern Friedrich's answer to the obvious
problems which flow from his doctrine of authority. For example, how do we
identify the "old, the learned, and the wise" persons who test the laws by their
capacity for reasoned elaboration? Who selects these arbiters? One suspects that
Friedrich has no better answer than the skeptics whom he censured for turning to
common sense in his chapter on modern skepticism which is entitled, innocuously enough, "The Decline of Legal Philosophy." He there states (p. 165):
These variations of common sense, like formalism itself, hide rather than solve the
philosophical problem because the question is precisely where the standards for evaluation of the common men whose common sense is being acclaimed come from?
What, indeed, is the source of standards for evaluating the work of the reasonable elaborators of Friedrich's "just" laws? If the answer is that the com-
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munity's system of values provides such standards, then who, other than the
reasonable elaborators, may apply such standards? If it is the people who are
the ultimate judges, then, in the crucial cases where community values are in
doubt, we are left with the will of the mob. If, on the other hand, there are no
"judges of the judges," how shall we escape the tyranny of the elite?
How then is justice to be determined when value systems are in doubt and
when controversy rages among powerful elements within a legal community?
The serious political and philosophical problems posed by such a situation,
problems inherent in a conception of justice as changing with changes in value
systems, are directly confronted by Friedrich in Chapter XXII, entitled "Law
and Order." Again, however, the problem is only further delineated, not answered in any definitive sense. In such times of stress the proponents of one
value system commonly assert that other value systems are unjust and therefore threaten attainment of a just order. The values of justice and order, toward
which all laws must be oriented, become identified; and anyone challenging the
existing legal order is guilty of injustice or lawlessness in the eyes of proponents
of the existing order. Although at various points in his analysis Friedrich appears to assume that justice and order are distinct values, he concludes that
society can realize them only concurrently and that it is erroneous to give one a
priority over the other-especially to make order the principal goal, an error
which he attributes to positivism. But a social, as distinguished from an individual, conception of justice which is not inextricably bound up with the value
of order is an obviously useless abstraction which the author apparently recognizes in rejecting the philosophical radicalism of Godwin and Thoreau.
Friedrich's discussion of this point might have been considerably clarified
if he had articulated the implications of his position. He seems to be saying that
justice is founded upon the underlying value complex of a community of which
order must be a part. During times of particularly rapid evolution of values it
often happens that one or more values are considered paramount by proponents
who are willing to overthrow the existing order rather than tolerate a denial of
their favorite value; any such emphasis, however, on a single value or group of
values is inevitably totalitarian and hence, fundamentally unjust.
At bottom, Friedrich concludes, breaches of law "in the fully developed legal
community" (p. 212) arise out of rejection by the violators of the value judgment implicit in the violated law. To a greater or lesser extent such violations
reflect a breakdown in the law's authority, either because the law itself is not
susceptible of reasoned elaboration within the accepted value system of the
community or because the violator is unable or refuses to accept such reasoning
or the underlying value judgments. In such a view of breach of law, the just
function of punishment is to control and perhaps dissuade those who would not
otherwise accept the value judgment underlying the law. There are manifold
aspects of this function, all of which have received historical recognition in the
form of one or another theories as to the purpose of penalties, e.g., consent,
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retribution or retaliation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and coercion. Friedrich
contends that a composite of these notions constitutes a more valid explanation
of the function of punishment which may operate in different ways upon different individuals, even in the same fact situation. He does, however, express considerable reservations concerning the direct coercive power of penalties, as distinguished from deterrence, and concludes that the extreme penalty of death is
unjustified in a modern democratic society.
It follows from Friedrich's dialectic view of justice that positive laws often
are or become unjust and, consequently, that punishment for violation of such
laws may be unjust also. Situations of this type ordinarily arise in a democratically organized community when the value judgment upon which a positive
law has been based ceases to be accepted by the community at large. Friedrich
recognizes this recurrent phenomena and offers the usual well-worn examplesprohibition, fornication, adultery, election laws, pre-Civil War abolition-all of
which illustrate laws nullified by popular "honoring in the breach" prior to
their formal repeal. Implicit in Friedrich's approach is the conclusion that this
process of popular rejection is a natural and defensible part of the law-making
process in a democratic society. Yet the occurrence of these popular revolutions,
bloodless or otherwise, casts serious doubt upon the validity of Friedrich's doctrine of authority. Many of the laws so repealed are amenable to some sort of
reasoned elaboration within the value system of the existing community,
whereas the common disobedience to such laws in many instances has only a
negative relationship to the community's system of ideas, values, and beliefs
and certainly would not be amenable to reasoned elaboration. Yet such irrational disobedience effectively nullifies positive laws long before they disappear
from the statute books. The existence of such situations suggests that the authority of law has considerably less to do with its susceptibility for reasoned
elaboration and bears a considerably more direct relationship to the irrational
motives of members of the community than seems to be admissible under
Friedrich's doctrine of authority. It must be borne in mind that this doctrine of
authority is the keystone in the structure of Friedrich's non-positivistic philosophy of law. To remove it would crumble the edifice into a morass of concepts
indistinguishable from the views of many modern realists whom he so thoroughly criticizes.
Perhaps the most critical deficiency in Friedrich's personal philosophy of law,
however, is the absence of any definitive principle to aid in answering the problem of when a breach of positive law is justified. Some such breach may be justified within the framework of Friedrich's philosophy. There are, however,
breaches of law in the name of justice which attack the fundamental constitutional organization of the community, i.e., basic individual rights and the
separation of powers. Although Friedrich never quite expresses the idea, it
seems evident from his emphasis on the constitutional form and his comments
upon the dangers to this form resulting from the spectacle of international
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anarchy that he considers democratic constitutional order a paramount and
virtually inviolable value. Moreover, one might fairly surmise that Friedrich
feels there is a right of revolution-a right to challenge the existing order as
unjust-except in a constitutional democracy. Friedrich's obvious retort would
be that revolution is unnecessary in a constitutional democracy because the
unique achievement of Western constitutionalism is to legalize the struggle over
what is just-to divert controversies over values into legal channels which make
revolution less necessary.
In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the two concluding chapters
of the book are devoted to constitutional law, first in its national and then in its
international aspect. To Friedrich the constitution is a means by which the
essential pluralism of social values is preserved by assuring participation of the
people in law-creating processes. Without the limitations which a democratic
constitution prescribes, totalitarianism would necessarily result. The identity
of the people, i.e., their plural value system, would then be sacrificed to particular social, economic or political values. Science, we are told by Friedrich,
teaches us that no people is willing to make the sacrifice of subordinating conflicting personal values to the ascendant values of the totalitarian ideology.
Thus the essential prerequisite of a just legal system is the formal participation
of all the people in the process of law-making. To Friedrich, "law is seen c. propelled by its own inner dialectic, as becoming more nearly true law the more
nearly it is a creation of the citizen-members of the legal community. .
(p. 223).
So strong is this notion that Friedrich accepts the proposition that a just
international law cannot exist without a world constitution and world citizenship. Genuine international law could, however, conceivably antedate a world
constitutional order if a large majority of the peoples participating in the creation of such world law were themselves members of constitutionally organized
legal communities. A just international law among totalitarian states or among
states most of which are organized upon a totalitarian basis is not possible. The
somber implications of this conclusion for current international affairs is inescapable. It is perhaps offset by the author's sanguine view of the potentialities of the European Coal and Steel Community as the beginning of a European
political community organized on a constitutional basis.
It would not be practicable to attempt a comprehensive critique of Friedrich's personal philosophy of law within the confines of an ordinary book review. Suffice it to suggest a few of the difficulties which this philosophy raises
and some questions concerning the fundamental philosophical premises upon
which it is based. Most of the unsolved practical problems of Friedrich's philosophy center about the content of the constitution in his best of all forms of
government. What, for example, are the basic individual and subgroup rights
which are to be preserved relatively inviolate from community encroachments.
Are they immutable and eternal or do they too evolve with the value system of
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the community? Friedrich's position that community values must be determined by the members of the community and that the most accurate method
of doing so, the democratic process augmented by authority, is confined to the
communal sphere. He does not suggest that these ideas or democratic process
should operate in the sphere of basic rights (the areas of religion, art, etc.). Yet
one of the most significant political acts is the formulation of the constitution
itself, at which point the community value system must perform the function of
delineating the communal.sphere of government. What is to prevent the community from constricting the private sphere into nothingness? At best Friedrich's answer is an unsupported generalization-palpably contradicted by history-that the nature of human psychology forbids so thoroughgoing an intrusion into an individual's privacy, and that a free society would not permit such
an invasion of individual rights. But this is the acme of circular political reasoning; it demonstrates that a totalitarian system contravenes human nature because the members of a free society do not desire totalitarianism-a premise
which follows from the definition of a free society as one in which the value
system rejects totalitarianism. To establish the validity of his conclusion with
any high degree of logical cogency, Friedrich must prove that a majority of the
individual members of any totalitarian community desire freedom for themselves and others. His proof on this point really amounts to no more than a bald
assertion that "the findings of history, psychology, sociology, and political science enable us to demonstrate the propositions with a high degree of probability" (p. 220).
It is submitted that there are no such findings worthy of being described as
scientific. History and psychoanalysts' notebooks contain a plethora of evidence that human beings generally are quite willing to sacrifice their selfidentity (their pluralistic being) and the freedom of others to religious, socioeconomic and other unitary ideals. Political and social existence within a free
society, whether in classic Athens or modem America, has been and is a constant
struggle among the few who wish to remain autonomous and the multitude who
would adjust everyone to the "norm." This problem is one of the most critical
in modern law creation and enforcement, and a philosophy of law which merely
describes the problem without suggesting the outlines of a solution has little of
practical value to commend it.
Some may urge that it is inappropriate to test a philosophy by practical
standards, but in philosophy of law the realms of the speculative and the practical necessarily coincide to a large extent. Indeed, at numerous points throughout his book, the author himself applies a standard of practicality to the ideas
of others and often uses it as an excuse for the absence of less rigorous or scientific demonstration of his own postulates.
A fair appraisal of Professor Friedrich's position on purely philosophical
grounds must be left to more competent and experienced hands. Perhaps, however, the reviewer may suggest that there are some defects in the fundamental
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philosophical position from which the author's philosophy of law is derived.
Like all thinking rooted in the Kantian tradition, Friedrich's philosophy of
experience stems from a strong reaction to the skeptical critique of human
reasoning and cognitive powers so persuasively propounded by David Hume.
Rather than accept the skeptics' conception of the fundamentally hypothetical
nature of all human knowledge and the fairly self-evident psychological propositions upon which this view is based, Kant and his followers have attempted to
map out areas of human knowedge and cognition having varying degrees of
certainty and validity. The result has often been a series of highly abstract
propositions, largely concerning conceptual relationships, virtually devoid of
substantive content and impregnated with the philosopher's personal prejudgments. This has been especially true of those Kantians (including Kant himself)
who have sharply distinguished the foundations of knowledge in the natural sciences from the bases of knowledge in the social sciences and the arts, a device
which facilitates the interjection of subjective elements into the discussion of
ethical and esthetic problems. Friedrich seems to have carried this development to an extreme, as demonstrated by the following remarkably candid
passage from his discussion of authority:
For critical rationalism has taught us that all comprehensive systems of thought
possess a metarational basis. It is not possible for finite human reason to grasp, let
alone understand, the infinite reaches of the real world. But within the limits set by
such a metarational framework of ideas, values, and beliefs, human reason can elaborate any utterance made... [p. 203].
Here is an almost express admission that the Kantian approach tends to convert philosophy from a search for truth into a quest for certainty. Ironically,
their overwhelming desire to fling out an anchor in skepticism's sea of doubt has
led Kant and his followers to create a philosophy which would deny to humanity all scientific knowledge of truth (i.e., reality). Fortunately, natural scientists have followed the skeptics, not Kant, and as a result have neither despaired of knowing reality nor accepted unreservedly the results of scientific
endeavor. Our political or, more broadly, behavioral sciences have been less
fortunate, perhaps because Kant held out a greater hope of certainty in this
realm and attempted to spell out his political and moral conclusions in conconsiderably greater detail. The result has been that psychology and sociology have, until relatively recent times, produced a great deal of uncorroborated
opinion and comparatively little else.
If the store of human knowledge concerning the origins and patterns of human behavior are ever to be meaningfully increased, our behavioral scientists
must learn to act more like scientists and less like priests. It is not enough merely to appear to approach the fundamental problems of law in a "scientific"
manner as Friedrich describes his own project (p. 4), when this amounts to no
more than analysis of the philosophizing and soul-searching of others who have
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done little, if any, research into the basic data which the philosophy attempts
to organize.
Without pursuing an analogy to absurdity, the current progress of the behavioral sciences may properly be compared to the achievements of biology in
classic Greece where matters of fact were decided by logic and dialectic rather
than by reference to reality insofar as it is or may be cognizable by human
beings. Until such time as our behavioral scientists are able to provide us with
more scientifically demonstrable and useful generalizations, the political organism must function without self-consciousness and, to a large extent, without
adequate knowledge of how to administer to its ills. This absence of knowledge
does not, however, deprive us of some practicable hypotheses as to a proper
political organization. Indeed, for the time being, governmental organizations
should be founded upon a recognition of how little we know concerning why and
how human beings, as individual and groups, behave as they do. As in the case
of surgery, until we have sounder bases upon which to operate, it would seem
wisest not to operate at all-at least until it becomes obvious that the patient
will not survive otherwise. Without knowledge as to how we may prescribe for
mankind's ills, it is sounder, from a purely methodological standpoint, to permit individuals to prescribe for themselves to the maximum extent practicable.
Science, after all, is a method of abstracting general relationships from the
infinite individual and unique things which comprise reality. It is useful when it
permits us to predict with a fair degree of accuracy the results of recurrent or
controllable fact situations and relationships. One may argue persuasively that
such usefulness is not attainable in the behavioral sciences because the fact
situations and relationships considered by that science either do not recur (i.e.,
the subject matter is too individualized and peculiar to adjnit of valid generalization) or are not controllable. A more cautious approach suggests simply that,
if such generalizations are possible, they do not now exist. Either view may lead
to the same conclusion, permanent in one case and tentative in the other, that,
in the absence of scientific generalization concerning their relationships, individuals should be treated as individuals except to the extent that practical
exigencies require otherwise.
To state the results less abstractly, constitutional democracy is the best form
of government precisely because any other form of government presupposes
knowledge which does not now exist. Power should be dispersed in the community and individuals be permitted maximum freedom in pursuing their
goals, because we do not have sufficient knowledge of human behavior to prescribe any different political organization. Government should be confined to
those matters which most directly and obviously concern the commonweal and
then only with the approval of a majority of the governed, because in the
absence of a scientific basis for a different course of action, individuals should be
considered and treated as essentially different. In short, we shall make fewer
mistakes with a negative philosophy of law, candidly recognizing the limits of
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our knowledge, than by accepting a philosophy of law, such as Professor
Friedrich's, derived from highly subjective sources and rejecting the possibility
of a more objective knowledge along the lines of the natural sciences.
Professor Friedrich's book is essentially a reasoned elaboration of Western
political development within the framework of the predominant modern philosophical view. It is challenging, persuasive and deserving of the most careful
consideration by everyone concerned with preserving individual liberty and the
democratic process in this time of their greatest trial.
EDWIN P. WILEY*
*
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Market Power: Size and Shape under the Sherman Act. By G. E. Hale and

Rosemary D. Hale. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958. Pp. xix, 522. $17.50.
The Hales have written one of the few worthwhile books in the trade regulation field. It is an excellent and reliable guide to the doctrines, the reasons given
in support of the doctrines, and to the cases in the area of market power. This
area is hard to define. The Hales are not always consistent as to its boundaries.
In general, they are discussing the problem of monopoly and not the problem
of conspiracy. But their eyes wander frequently, so that we get their views on
such matters as intracorporate conspiracies, allocations of territories, and
something of patent license arrangements. In part, the uncertain boundaries no
doubt are due to the growth of so much of the book through separate law review essays, but another explanation is the seamless web which the Hales remind us is the character of antitrust law. In the area of its principal emphasis,
the book suffers from an inadequate exploration of the history, impact and
probable future importance of Section Seven of the Clayton Act. But this is
only to say that the book already requires a supplement which, it is hoped, the
authors are now preparing in a manner as workmanlike as the present volume.
The Hales have written a work of theology, and what they have described
or constructed does not always please them. They usually remain even-tempered about it all, although there are a few indications of indignation, such as
when they refer to moral muddlement (which they are against), or when they
conclude with a recommendation, which might be thought to involve some
desperation, that Section Two of the Sherman Act should be repealed in favor
of a limitation upon the over-all size of business enterprise. But these indications
of indignation or desperation are exceptions from the patient examination of
almost everything that anyone--lawyer or economist-has said in print in the
reputable secondary materials on the monopoly problem. And briefs and congressional hearings are drawn upon also. The result is an amazing collection of
rationalizations for different positions, and at times the presentation of the

